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NOTES
Bowsher v. Synar: Separation of Powers, the Removal of
Officers, and the Administrative State
On December 12, 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed into law
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,' better
known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The bill specified annual
federal budget deficit ceilings which would progressively decrease to zero
by 1991. The Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were charged with projecting
the budget deficit for the upcoming fiscal year and calculating, according
to the Act's provisions, budget reductions needed in each program so
that the deficit would not exceed the statutory ceiling. The Comptroller
General was to review the Directors' report, and then to issue his own
calculations of the necessary budget reductions to the President. This
was the Act's automatic mechanism which then required the President
to sequester funds according to the Comptroller General's calculations.
Also on December 12, Mike Synar, a Member of the House of
Representatives, brought suit in federal district court seeking declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional
in two respects: first, that the power of the President and other officers
under the Act was granted through an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power; second, that the grant of power to the Comptroller
General and Director of the CBO, both alleged by the plaintiffs to be
legislative officers, violated the principle of separation of powers since
the power in question was executive in nature.2
The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the
delegation of legislative authority was not excessive, but that the exercise
of executive power by a legislative officer did violate separation of
powers.3 The court's invalidation of the Comptroller General's role
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
2. Eleven other members of Congress and the National Treasury Employees Union
later joined as plaintiffs in the action. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-
1379 (D.D.C. 1986).
3. Id. at 1377.
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triggered a fallback provision of the Act,4 included because constitutional
problems had been anticipated, whereby the Directors' report would be
submitted to a special joint committee of Congress. Congress would
then have the option of acting upon the report through normal legislative
channels.
In the case of Bowsher v. Synar,l the Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling of the lower court on the separation of powers question. The
Court held that a legislative officer (i.e., one removable by Congress)
may not exercise executive power. 6 It based this holding on two premises:
first, that Congress may not exercise control over the executive beyond
that specifically designated in the Constitution; and second, that the
power to remove is the power to control. The first premise is the
extension of the Court's view that many checks and balances, instead
of being the guarantors of separation of powers, are actually the an-
tithesis of that structure of government. The second premise is common
sense-the power a man fears is not that which appointed him but that
which may remove him.
At issue in Bowsher was the exercise of executive power by the
Comptroller General, who was removable by Congress. The Court there-
fore examined the nature of the President's power to remove officers
vested with executive authority, in order to determine the constitutionality
of Congress's attempt to usurp this power. The Court's rationale sug-
gested that this power of removal is inherent in the President's position
as Chief Executive.
The purpose of this Note is to explain the Court's rationale in
Bowsher, particularly as it concerned the relationship of separation of
powers to checks and balances, and to examine the implications of that
rationale. The Note draws two general implications from Bowsher: first,
that the Congress may not limit the President's power to remove officers
vested with executive authority; and, second, that no single person or
agency may exercise more than one of the three primary powers of
government (legislative, executive, and judicial).
The scope of this Note includes:
1) An historical development of the theory of separation of
powers from its inception to its embodiment in the United States
Constitution;
2) A review of the historical debate concerning the specific
aspect of separation of powers which most concerned the Bowsher
Court, that is, the nature of the presidential removal power;
4. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, § 274(0, 99 Stat. 1038, 1100 (1985).
5. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
6. The Court did not reach the issue of excessive delegation.
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3) A critical analysis of the Bowsher opinion, including an
attempt to reveal the perspective the Court crafted in reconciling
the removal power debate; and finally,
4) A look at the possible implications of the Bowsher rationale,
including its impact on the extent of the removal power, and,
more generally, an application of the Court's analysis to the
structure of the present administrative state.
Separation of Powers: Montesquieu to Madison
Although the idea of a tripartite separation of governmental powers
had already been developing in theory and in practice for many years,
it was first coherently enunciated in 1748 by the French political phi-
losopher Baron de Montesquieu in his great work De ('Esprit des Loix.
Montesquieu could look back at the history of Western civilization and
find a great diversity of political systems: empires, monarchies, aristo-
cracies, republics, and even democracies. Yet, out of these various
systems a general pattern arose consisting of consolidation of authority
within the governmental structure and aggrandizement of powers to the
government itself at the expense of individual liberties. This pattern held
true even in popularly based governments.
7
The issue for Montesquieu therefore was: how can a government
be structured so that it will remain limited, or in his words "moderate,"
and not tend to increasingly encroach on the freedoms of its citizens?
The answer, said Montesquieu, is to diffuse the power of government:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were
it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be
then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression.'
7. Montesquieu, De I'Esprit des Loix, in The Great Legal Philosophers 160, 169
(C. Morris ed. 1959):
Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political
liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these, it is
not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power; but constant
experience shews us, that everyman invested with power is apt to abuse it, and
to carry his authority as far as it will go.
8. Id. at 169.
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Montesquieu did not advocate an absolute separation between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This is apparent from his
use of the contemporary English Constitution as an example of separation
of powers. 9 As James Madison observed, the English government was
rife with interactions between the three branches. 10 Madison therefore
concluded that Montesquieu
did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His
meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively
as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more
than this, that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department, the fundamental principles of a free con-
stitution are subverted."
After the Revolution, the principles of separation of powers were
expressly enshrined in the constitutions of most of the American states. 12
In practice, however, no state completely separated the departments of
power. Each had various provisions which allowed some interdepart-
mental interactions. Examples of such checks and balances included
executive appointment of judges, executive veto of proposed laws, leg-
islative involvement in impeachment proceedings, and even legislative
election of the executive. 3
Madison took note of these various state governments in Federalist
No. 47, observing that some mixture of the powers of government was
9. Id. at 169-70'
10. The Federalist No. 47, at 314 (J. Madison) (Modern Library College ed.):
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate
and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part
of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with
foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force
of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed
by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament,
and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils.
One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council
to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial
power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate
jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the
legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations,
though not admitted to a legislative vote.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 316. A typical example was the constitution of North Carolina, which
provided that "the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought
to be forever separate and distinct from each other." Id. at 319.
13. Id. at 316-20.
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possible without compromising the needed separation to the point of
defeating its effectiveness. He concluded, however, that
[i]t is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental
principle under consideration [i.e. separation of powers] had
been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual con-
solidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has
a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice
the separation delineated on paper. 14
Madison made these comments in support of the checks and balances
of the proposed United States Constitution. The basic structure of the
Constitution itself and of the national government that it envisions is
grounded in the principles of separation of powers: Article I, Section
1, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives;"' 5 Article II, Section 1, "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America; ' 16 Article III,
Section 1, "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.' 1 7 Provisions within the doc-
ument for interplay between the three branches temper this separation.'
The Removal Power: Differing Opinions
The only power to remove officers mentioned in the Constitution
is the impeachment power vested in Congress."s The issue of the existence
of an implied presidential power of removal, and the limitations thereon,
has been debated since the origins of the document. Alexander Hamilton
wrote in Federalist No. 77 that a presidential removal power could be
implied in the appointment power, but "[t]he consent of [the Senate]
would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint."' 9 This conclusion,
14. Id. at 320.
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
16. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
17. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4: "The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
19. The Federalist No. 77, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library College ed.). U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2 provides that the President
shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
1987]
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however, was not universally accepted, even at the time it was advanced.
The question was open for debate when the First Congress met in 1789.
On June 16, 1789, James Madison introduced a bill in the House
of Representatives to establish an Executive Department of Foreign
Affairs. This bill stated that the head of the Department was "to be
removable from office by the President of the United States." ' 20 Debate
erupted concerning whether this language implied that the President did
not already have a removal power by virtue of the Constitution. Those
who believed in this inherent power supported deletion of the passage.
Madison, who had not intended the restrictive view of presidential power,
argued for deletion of the language and voted accordingly. 2' The House
at first voted against deletion. 22 After a weekend of lobbying, Madison's
supporters introduced a new motion which proposed substitution of the
phrase, "whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from
office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of
vacancy," in place of the disputed phrase. 23 This alternative language
clearly suggested recognition of a presidential removal power inherent
in the Constitution. After debate, the alternative was adopted by a
closely divided House and Senate. 24 The resolution of this dispute was
thereafter known as the Decision of 1789, a recognition of the implied
presidential power of removal, but hardly a consensus.
Since the Decision of 1789, wide differences of opinion have con-
tinued to surface concerning the existence and extent of the removal
power. Not surprisingly, Congress has tried to limit the power by as-
serting that it has a rightful role in removal, the President has generally
tried to expand the power by asserting that the restrictions by Congress
are unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court has equivocated.
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.
The selection of officers by the President with advice and consent of the Senate was
apparently accepted at the Constitutional Convention after the alternatives of vesting the
appointment power in the President alone or in a select tribunal had been considered
and rejected. The Federalist No. 76 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library College ed.).
20. 1 Annals of Cong. 473 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
21. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal Constitution: The Impact
of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1335, 1380-82 (1976).
22. The House voted on Friday, June 19, 1789. The measure to delete was defeated
34-20. 1 Annals of Cong. 599 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
23. 1 Annals of Cong. 601 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
24. The measure passed the House on Monday, June 22, 1789, only three days after
the previous vote. The vote was 30-18 in the House and a tie in the Senate, with Vice-
President John Adams casting the tie-breaking vote in favor of the alternative language.
Of the eight House members who had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
six voted for passage. Of the ten Senators who had been delegates, six voted for passage.
Burkoff, supra note 21, at 1383.
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Congress has asserted varying degrees of power in the appointment
and removal of executive officers, ranging from statutory restrictions
on presidential power to remove, 2 to actual appointment or removal
by Congress acting alone. 26 These instances of dabbling in executive
control have not always passed constitutional muster when challenged.
Perhaps some of the most strident claims to power were advanced during
the impeachment proceedings against President Andrew Johnson. The
basis for the charges against Johnson was his alleged violation of the
Tenure of Office Act of 1867, which provided that "the Secretaries of
State ... [and] of War . . .shall hold their offices respectively for and
during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed
and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate." ' 27 Representative John Logan, a Manager
of the impeachment cause, concluded, "The Constitution is silent upon
the subject of tenure. I hold, therefore, that the whole power is vested
in Congress to provide, whenever and however they choose, both for
appointment to and removal from office." 2s This statement prompted
one commentator to remark, "Could Representative Logan have been
looking at the same Constitution, or the same history, that we have
been discussing?" '29
Past presidents, having had a very different perspective than that
of Representative Logan, have inevitably reached a different conclusion.
President Washington lobbied hard for the Decision of 1789, and John
Adams cast the deciding vote in its favor in the Senate. 0 This set the
tone for future administrations-that the power of removal of executive
officers free of congressional restraint is inherent in the Presidency as
is provided by the Constitution. The obvious attraction of this position
was that it gave the President virtually complete control over the members
of his own branch (which, incidentally, was the major flaw of the
position from the standpoint of members of Congress). President Thomas
Jefferson, for instance, could not imagine how he could execute his
duties effectively without the threat of removing disobedient subordi-
nates.3 Jefferson, a Republican, had come to office after twelve years
25. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623, 55 S. Ct.
869, 872 (1935), where Congress allowed the President to remove the Federal Trade
Commissioner only "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
26. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), where the Supreme
Court invalidated Congress's power to appoint members of the Federal Election Com-
mission.
27. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430.
28. The Trial of Andrew Johnson, Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Supp. at 261
(1868).
29. Burkoff, supra note 21, at 1390.
30. See supra note 24.
31. 1 W. Goldsmith, The Growth of Presidential Power 157, 164-66 (1974).
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of Federalist rule, and was moved to remark that "Federalists seldom
died and never resigned." 32 Many Attorneys General throughout the
1800's reiterated the claim of a presidential removal power.3 Later,
William Howard Taft made perhaps the most extensive claim to pres-
idential power in this area, stating that the President had absolute powers
to fire and hire-the Logan Doctrine in reverse.3 4
One of the earliest decisions by the Supreme Court concerning the
nature of the removal power was In re Hennen.3 5 At issue was a district
judge's power to remove a clerk that he had appointed. The power to
appoint had been vested in the judge by Congress pursuant to the
appointment clause of Article II. The Court held that the power to
remove did exist: "In the absence of all constitutional provisions or
statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule,
to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appoint-
ment.'' 36 The Court also considered the removal of officers appointed
by the President with advice and consent in the Senate. The majority
recalled the Decision of 1789 and concluded that "the practical con-
struction of the Constitution [was] that this [removal] power was vested
in the President alone." 3 7
Justice John McLean pointed out the inconsistency of In re Hennen
in his dissenting opinion in United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie"8 :
"The reasoning is: the President and Senate appoint to office; therefore,
the President may remove from office. Now, the argument would be
legitimate, if the power to. remove were inferred to be the same that
appoints.' ' 9 The logical conclusion, reasoned McLean, is that the Sen-
ate's concurrence would be required for removal. °
The language by the Court in Hennen concerning "the absence of
... statutory regulation" left open the question of whether Congress
could by statute limit the power to remove. This issue was addressed
in United States v. Perkins,4' in which the Court granted back pay to
32. S. Gay, James Madison 139 (1884).
33. See, e.g., 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 462 (1860); 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 233 (1856); 5 Op.
Att'y Gen. 288 (1851); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 157 (1818).
34. W. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 76 (1916).
35. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
36. Id. at 259.
37. Id.
38. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854).
39. Id. at 306 (McLean, J., dissenting).
40. Justice McLean failed to recognize that a veto over removal has very different
consequences than a veto over appointment. A veto over removal gives the Senate the
implicit power of appointment of an executive officer (the incumbent) over the Chief
Executive's objections. Conversely, no person may hold executive office over the Chief
Executive's objections if the Senate possesses a veto only over appointment.
41. 116 U.S. 483, 6 S. Ct. 449 (1886).
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a Navy cadet-engineer who had been appointed by the Secretary of the
Navy and removed by him in spite of a statute prohibiting the removal.
"[W]hen Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers
in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest." 4 The Court inferred
this power to restrict removal from Congress's constitutional power to
vest appointment.
Perkins controlled the removal power of department heads, but not
that of the President. The 1926 case of Myers v. United States43 involved
the removal of a postmaster by the President alone, despite the existence
of a statute stating that postmasters "shall be appointed and may be
removed by the President and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.""4 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Taft, ruled that the Senate's role in the removal as provided in the
statute was unconstitutional. Taft wrote that, in order for the President
effectively to execute his duties, all of his subordinates must be agents
of his will and therefore must be under his control. "The imperative
reasons requiring an unrestricted power to remove the most important
of his subordinates in their most important duties must, therefore, control
the interpretation of the Constitution as to all appointed by him." '45
When Congress vests the power of appointment in the head of a de-
partment, it "may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and re-
stricting the [appointing officer] in the exercise of the power of removal.""
But even in that situation, for Congress to "draw to itself, or to either
branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the
exercise of that power . . .would be . . . to infringe the constitutional
principle of the separation of governmental powers." ' 47 Taft further wrote
that he believed this rationale extended to the removal of Interstate
Commerce Commissioners and other executive officers who might wield
quasi-judicial power. 48
The Court's expansive view of the presidential removal power en-
visioned in Myers lasted only until Humphrey's Executor v. United
States" was decided nine years later. Humphrey's Executor involved the
removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner by the President without
cause, despite a statutory provision that commissioners "'may be re-
moved by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
42. Id. at 485, 6 S. Ct. at 450.
43. 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926).
44. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80.
45. 272 U.S. at 134, 47 S. Ct. at 31.
46. Id. at 161, 47 S. Ct. at 40.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 135, 47 S. Ct. at 31.
49. 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935).
19871
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in office."' 50 The Supreme Court interpreted this language to bar removal
for any reason other than those enumerated in the statute. The Court
then addressed the constitutionality of this restrictive provision under
Myers, and held that Myers only controlled the removal of "purely
executive officers." A Federal Trade Commissioner is not "purely ex-
ecutive," since he "occupies no place in the executive department and
•.. exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution
in the President," but instead acts only "in the discharge and effectuation
of . . .quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, or as an [officer of an]
agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government."'"
The Court therefore concluded that the President does not possess
"illimitable power of removal" of officers who exercise only legislative
and/or judicial powers, since this would violate the concept of separation
of powers. 2
The next Supreme Court case specifically concerning the removal
power was Wiener v. United States,53 a 1958 case which involved the
issue of whether the President without cause could remove a War Claims
Commissioner. The act establishing the Commission, a quasi-judicial
body, did not expressly prohibit such removal, but did bar the President
from influencing the Commission on a particular claim. The Court
therefore concluded that "Congress did not wish to have hang over the
Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no
reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men
of his own choosing, '"" and held the removal unlawful under Hum-
phrey's Executor. This was the last holding by the Supreme Court
concerning the removal power until the case of Bowsher v. Synar in
1986.
Bowsher v. Synar: Return to Montesquieu
The issue which the Supreme Court confronted in Bowsher v. Synar
was "whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General
of the United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 [violated] the doctrine of
separation of powers." 55 The Court affirmed the ruling of the lower
court by finding that the Act did violate the constitutional separation
50. Id. at 620, 55 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914)). The removal
language remains the same in the amended statute. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
51. 295 U.S. at 628, 55 S. Ct. at 874.
52. Id. at 629-30, 55 S. Ct. at 874-75.
53. 357 U.S. 349, 78 S. Ct. 1275 (1958).
54. Id. at 356, 78 S. Ct. at 1279.
55. 106 S. Ct. at 3184.
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of powers. This finding was based on two major premises: (1) that no
officer of Congress may exercise executive power except as is provided
in the Constitution, and (2) that the power to remove an officer is
equivalent to the power to control his actions.
In order to derive these two principles, the Court traced the history
of the debate over Congress's role in the removal of officers. The
opinion first set forth the constitutional and philosophical bases for the
general principle of separation of powers, quoting Montesquieu,5 6 the
Supreme Court decisions of INS v. Chadha 7 and Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer," and the Constitution itself.5 9 From these sources,
the Court concluded that "[t]he Framers provided a vigorous legislative
branch and a separate and wholly independent executive branch.'' 6 The
Court acknowledged that such separation inevitably produces "conflicts,
confusion, and discordance," but found it necessary to limit the growth
of governmental power.
The Court then turned to the involvement of Congress in the removal
of executive officers:
The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Con-
gress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts .... [T]he Constitution explicitly provides
for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only
upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and con-
viction by the Senate .... A direct congressional role in the
removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws
beyond this limited one is inconsistent with separation of powers. 6'
To support this view, the Court invoked James Madison's comments
during the debates over the Decision of 1789, in which Madison argued
in favor of the notion that the President did have removal powers
implicit in the Constitution, even if Congress did not grant such powers
statutorily.6 2 The Court concluded that "Madison's position ultimately
56. See text accompanying supra note 7.
57. 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983): "The Constitution sought to
divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories,
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial .... "
58. 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 870 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring): The
purpose of separation of powers was to "diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty."
59. See text accompanying supra notes 15-17.
60. 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
61. Id. at 3187.
62. 1 Annals of Cong. 380 (J. Gales ed. 1789), James Madison speaking:
Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly
grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now deliberating, than
that founded on the mingling of the Executive and Legislative branches of the
Government in one body. It has been objected, that the Senate have too much
1987]
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prevailed and a congressional role in the removal process was rejected.
This 'Decision of 1789' provides 'contemporaneous and weighty evidence'
of the Constitution's meaning since many of the Members of the first
Congress 'had taken part in framing that instrument."'' 63
The Court then summarized judicial precedent on the issue of the
removal power by citing Myers v. United States, Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, and Wiener v. United States. The holding of Myers
was quoted to be: "[T]hat for Congress to 'draw to itself, or to either
branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the
exercise of that power ... would be ... to infringe the constitutional
principle of the separation of governmental powers."'6' The Court then
looked at the Humphrey's Executor and Wiener opinions as distinguish-
able from Myers, but, nonetheless, "reaffirming its [Myers's] holding
that congressional participation in the removal of executive officers is
unconstitutional.' '63 Humphrey's Executor and Wiener, which up to this
time had been interpreted by many observers as major restrictions on
the scope of the Myers holding, were thus treated in Bowsher as prin-
cipally important in their reaffirmation of the principles and conclusions
of Myers.
The Court finally buttressed its disavowal of the constitutionality
of a congressional role in removal by analogizing it to the power of
legislative veto, which had been ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.
"Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for
executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Con-
of the Executive power even, by having a control over the President in the
appointment to office. Now, shall we extend this connexion between the Leg-
islative and Executive departments, which will strengthen the objection, and
diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the Executive?
63. 106 S. Ct. at 3187 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790, 103 S. Ct.
3330, 3335 (1983)). The Court did not note, however, that the persuasiveness of this
evidence might be considered somewhat weakened by the lack of true consensus indicated
by the debates and votes. The measure in support of Madison's position failed passage
on the first attempt in the House and only passed the Senate after a tie-breaking vote
cast by the Vice President. See supra note 24. Furthermore, it might be presumptuous
to deduce that the vote stood for anything more than the existence of a constitutional
presumption that a presidential removal power exists in the absence of contrary statutory
provisions. See Burkoff, supra note 21, at 1381.
64. Id. at 3188 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161, 47 S. Ct. 21, 40
(1926)).
65. Id. The Court further stated:
Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court [in Humphrey's Executor] also un-
derscored the crucial role of separated powers in our system: "The fundamental
necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government
entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either
of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question."
Id. (quoting Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-30, 55 S. Ct. at 874).
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gress." 16 Such power is tantamount to a veto over the execution of
laws, reasoned the Court, and is therefore impermissible under Chadha.
From the foregoing the Court concluded that "Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the
execution of the laws except by impeachment.' '67
The Court's historical analysis is notable for its emphasis on the
view that the Constitution envisions a government premised on a sep-
aration of powers in the strictest sense; the only exceptions to that
premise which will be countenanced under this view are those enumerated
in or directly implied by the text of the Constitution." This approach
is supported by Montesquieu and Madison, both of whom viewed "checks
and balances" as interplay between the branches of government, unifying
them in purpose and thrust. Such interplay within the government is
the obvious antithesis of that separation designed to guarantee the rights
of the people against those in power. Why then have any such interplay?
Because some coordination of direction is needed to achieve the legitimate
ends of government. It was on this basis that Madison concluded that
some interactions are needed to temper the disunity inherent in a gov-
ernment of separated powers. 69 Limiting the breaches of separation to
those enumerated in the Constitution allows the necessary amount of
unity envisioned by the Framers while still maintaining the essence of
a tripartite structure. A more liberal interpretation of the permissible
checks and balances, letting the powers vest in officers according to
66. 106 S. Ct. at 3189.
67. 106 S. Ct. at 3188. The Court added:
As the District Court observed, "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the
authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that
he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey." ... The structure
of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows
that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not
possess.
Id. (quoting Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1401). See also id. at 3189:
The dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have
long been recognized. "IT]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the
Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch
of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other
two branches." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129, 96 S. Ct. 612, 687, 46
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Indeed, we also have observed only recently that "[tlhe
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the
outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be
resisted." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
68. Justice White considered the majority's opinion to be a "distressingly formalistic
view of separation of powers." He wrote that Congress has the power to set up independent
officers and agencies through the "necessary and proper" clause. 106 S. Ct. 3205-06
(White, J., dissenting).
69. See text accompanying supra notes 8-11.
1987]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
political expediency, would eventually lead to such unification of the
powers of government as to defeat the structure's protection of individual
liberties. 70 The exceptions (checks and balances) would swallow the rule
(separation of powers).
The very structure of the Constitution also supports the restrictive
approach to permissible checks and balances taken by the Court in
Bowsher. As a premise, each branch is assigned its respective primary
power (legislative, executive, or judicial) at the outset of its respective
Article (I, II, or III). 7 1 This power is thereafter modified by checks,
balances, and other limitations. Logic dictates that where no such mod-
ifications exist a return to the original premise of separation of powers
is in order.
The Court next set about the task of determining whether the
Comptroller General is an officer of Congress and whether he is assigned
executive powers under the instant Act.
The Court first found that the Comptroller General is an officer
of Congress. The "critical factor" in this determination was the statutory
provision for the Comptroller's removability; he could be removed by
Joint Resolution of Congress on the basis of "(i) permanent disability;
(ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony
or conduct involving moral turpitude.' '72 These circumstances exceed
those for which an executive officer may be impeached. 73 The Comp-
troller was therefore under the control of Congress.
The Court then determined that the power assigned to the Comp-
troller under the Act was executive in nature:
Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the leg-
islative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law.
Under § 251, the Comptroller General must exercise judgment
concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must
also interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely
what budgetary calculations are required. Decisions of that kind
70. See text accompanying supra note 14.
71. See text accompanying supra notes 15-17.
72. 31 U.S.C. 703(e)(1) (1982).
73. But see 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 56-
57 (E. Bennett ed. 1858):
In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments, it will be found,
that many offences, not easily definable by law, and many of a purely political
character, have been deemed high crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this
extraordinary remedy. Thus, lord chancellors, and judges, and other magistrates,
have not only been impeached for bribery, and acting grossly contrary to the
duties of their office; but for misleading their sovereign by unconstitutional
opinions, and for attempts to subvert the fundamental laws, and introduce
arbitrary power.
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are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.
Since an officer of Congress may not exercise executive power, the grant
of power to the Comptroller General was deemed unconstitutional.
To remedy the problem, attorneys for the government urged that the
Court overturn the provisions of the 1921 law which made the Comptroller
removable by Congress. The Court rejected this alternative, reasoning that
the legislative nature of the Comptroller General was an integral consid-
eration in the assignment of power. "Indeed, striking the removal pro-
visions would lead to a statute that Congress would probably have refused
to adopt."75 Instead, the Court opted to invoke the fallback provision
of the 1985 Act. This provided that, in the event the reporting procedure
of section 251 was invalidated, the Directors of OMB and CBO would
issue reports directly to Congress. Congress could then take legislative
action through the normal constitutional avenues to cut spending.
Implications
The immediate consequence of the Bowsher decision was to knock
out the automatic linchpin of a landmark piece of deficit control leg-
islation-the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Proving the fallback pro-
vision could work, Congress voted to reinstate previous cuts invalidated
by Bowsher. The allure of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, though, had always
been in the automatic cuts and apparent lack of congressional involve-
ment. Proposed changes are therefore being debated as of this writing
aimed at solving the separation of powers problem. One of these pro-
posals would vest the executive power in the Director of OMB, who is
removable by the President; another would make the Comptroller Gen-
eral removable by the President.
The significance of the case, though, extends far beyond the confines
of deficit reduction. The rationale of the decision calls into question
the validity of many of the theories which have been advanced concerning
the removal power. These theories can be divided into three general
categories: (1) Congress may have a positive role in the removal of
executive officers (i.e., some vote by Congress or one branch of it is
needed before an officer may be removed); 76 (2) Congress may have a
74. 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
75. Id. at 3193. See also Justice Blackmun's dissent, in which he argued that the
Court should have invalidated the 1921 removal provision instead of striking down the
Comptroller General's role. "[Tihe only sensible way to choose between two conjunctively
unconstitutional statutory provisions is to determine which provision can be invalidated
with the least disruption of congressional objectives." 106 S. Ct. at 3216. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
76. See, e.g., the statutory provision in Myers, text accompanying supra note 44;
Justice McLean's position, text accompanying supra notes 38-40; Rep. Logan's position,
text accompanying supra note 28; and Hamilton's position, text accompanying supra note
19.
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negative role in the removal of executive officers (i.e., by imposing
statutory restrictions on the reasons for which the President may re-
move);" and (3) Congress may have no role in the removal of executive
officers except by impeachment. 78
The removal mechanism of the Comptroller General under the Act
is perhaps the clearest example of a positive congressional role. His
removal is initiated and voted upon by Congress; the President is never
involved. Such removal of an executive officer is unconstitutional ac-
cording to Bowsher.
But what about a lesser positive role or even a negative role for
Congress? Certainly one of the most attractive theories of removal has
been that which implies the power to remove from the power to appoint,
and which would therefore allow removal by the President with advice
and consent of the Senate if the appointment had been made by that
mechanism. The Senate would not initiate removal; only its assent would
be required. Indeed, such a theory was advanced by Hamilton. But the
Court in Bowsher did not rely on the implication of the power of
removal in the power of appointment.7 9 The Court instead, in reaffirming
Myers, found the President's removal power a necessary element of
control so that he could perform his constitutional executive duties. It
implied this power from the structure of the Constitution. The analysis
seemed to be: the premise of the Constitution is one of separation of
the powers of government; the only textual modification of this sepa-
ration that bears on removal is the impeachment power; the absence of
a modification of the President's removal power calls for a return to
the premise of separation of powers; since the power to remove is the
power to control, the Constitution's grant of the executive power to
the President implies that he, and not the Congress, has the power to
remove officers exercising executive power. This analysis would seem to
invalidate any congressional role-positive, negative or anything in be-
tween-in the removal of executive officers.8 0 Such a role would con-
stitute an encroachment by one branch into the dominion of another.
77. See, e.g., the statutory provision in Perkins, text accompanying supra notes 41-
42.
78. See, e.g., the position of the executive branch, text accompanying supra notes
30-34; and Taft's opinion in Myers, text accompanying supra notes 43-48.
79. See the criticism of this theory in supra note 40.
80. Justice White pointed out that the Court did not hold "that 'executive' powers
of the sort granted the Comptroller by the Act may only be exercised by officers removable
at will by the President." 106 S. Ct. at 3206 (White, J., dissenting). See also 106 S. Ct.
at 3188 n.4, where the majority dismissed assertions that the "negative" removal restrictions
of independent agency directors would be invalidated by the holding. This Note does not
assert that the holding in Bowsher invalidates those restrictions, but that the rationale
used in achieving that holding leads to the conclusion that such restrictions are uncon-
stitutional.
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'The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three depart-
ments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and
is hardly open to serious question."' 81 Such a line of reasoning, if
consistently followed, would call for the invalidation of all restrictions
on the President's power to remove officers exercising executive power.
Indeed, even Humphrey's Executor had reaffirmed the illimitable
power of the President to remove "purely executive" officers. But
imbedded in the term "purely executive" is the implication that some-
where there exists "partly executive" officers, i.e., officers who exercise
executive power along with judicial or legislative power. Such officers
with "mixed" powers are in fact prevalent in today's administrative
state, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion. 2 For
example, the FTC Commissioner who was the subject of dismissal in
Humphrey's Executor was deemed to possess both quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative authority. 3
Perhaps the most vexing question arising out of Bowsher is: how
is it permissible that one such officer or agency can possess more than
one of the three primary powers under the Constitution's structure of
separated powers (except as is textually provided)? The answer, Bowsher
seems to say, is: it is not permissible. The Court was very clear in its
analysis: the officer is legislative; the power is executive; the combination
is unconstitutional. The majority did not attempt to determine the overall
nature of the Comptroller General's office after theoretically fusing the
new power to his other powers (perhaps making him a quasi-legislative
officer with quasi-executive characteristics, "impurely" legislative under
Humphrey's Executor). Since executive authority may not be exercised
by a legislative officer, it follows that legislative authority may not be
exercised by an executive officer. Thus, while Bowsher did not address
the question of delegation per se 4 of legislative authority, it did have
81. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 (quoting Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-
30, 55 S. Ct. at 874).
82. 106 S. Ct. at 3198-99 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. See text accompanying supra note 51.
84. The district court opinion has a lengthy discussion of the delegation doctrine,
concluding that there are limits to the amount of authority Congress may delegate, but
those limits were not exceeded by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. See Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1382-91 (D.D.C. 1986).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, refused to join the majority's character-
ization of the power delegated as executive. He instead dubbed it legislative, and argued
the delegation should be stricken as excessive. This is noteworthy since no delegation of
Congress's legislative authority has been invalidated since 1935. See A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). Stevens stated that:
Even though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative power to
19871
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
much to say about to whom that authority may be delegated. The same
would be true about assignment of judicial power.
The logical end to such reasoning is the categorization of each of
the officers and agencies of the federal government into one of the
three branches, and the categorization of every governmental power as
legislative, executive, or judicial. The Court would then strike down any
assignment of authority inconsistent with the category of the officer
receiving the assignment. This would mean that no single person or
agency could act as, say, both rule-maker and enforcer. A greatly
different government than the one with which we are familiar would
result. Such extreme implications may at first seem far-fetched, but such
categorization was exactly the method by which the Court struck down
the assignment of power in Bowsher.
The Federal Trade Commission exemplifies an agency with combined
functions. "[T]he Commission formulates policies, as does the Congress.
It investigates and prosecutes, as does the executive branch. It adjudi-
cates, as does the judiciary." 85 There is some separation of powers
within the agency, but "prosecutors and judges are still responsible to
the Commission. 8 6 In fact, the National Labor Relations Board is the
only agency in the federal government which has nearly complete sep-
aration of its General Counsel (who issues complaints) from the rest of
the agency.87 The FTC and other agencies like it do not withstand the
strict separation of powers requirements alluded to in Bowsher.88
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens disagreed that such a strict ap-
plication of the separation doctrine is feasible. The majority opinion, he
says,
rests on the unstated and unsound premise that there is a definite
line that distinguishes executive power from legislative power....
[Glovernmental power cannot always be readily characterized
with only one of [the] three labels. On the contrary, as our
cases demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will
independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion
of its lawmaking power, when it elects to exercise such power itself, it may
not authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative Branch to act on its
behalf.
106 S. Ct. at 3205 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens here appeared to be taking the
position that the delegation by Congress is constitutional only if the separation of powers
is violated.
85. S. Breyer & R. Steward, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 859 (2d ed.
1985).
86. Id. at 860.
87. Id. at 861.
88. For a thorough discussion of the nature and responsibilities of most of the
independent agencies, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
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often take on the aspect of the office to which it is assigned.8 9
In Bowsher, for instance, the Court struck down the power of the
Comptroller General because that power was "executive." As a remedy,
the same power was given to Congress to exercise through its law-making
ability. The Comptroller, who is legislative, could not issue the order
to the President, but the Congress could issue that order.' The President
has an opportunity to veto Congress's action, but this does not alter
the inherently legislative nature of the action. Has the power exercised
changed from executive to legislative simply because the one who wields
it has changed?
This paradox illustrates that the line-drawing in which the majority
engaged is no simple task. Yet difficulty is not reason enough for the
Court to abandon efforts to maintain the fidelity of the division of
powers. To recognize that close calls do exist is a far cry from Justice
Stevens's stance which would allow clearly judicial officers to continue
to exercise clearly executive powers. 9° Bowsher strongly indicates the
majority's intention to make the clear calls and the close calls when
one branch encroaches into the province of another.
Conclusion
In Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court struck down a key provision
of perhaps the major budget control act of the 1980's. This alone makes
the case noteworthy.
Yet the implications of Bowsher in the area of constitutional law
might far overshadow the deficit control act itself. The Court ruled that
Congress could not grant executive power to any officer which it could
remove by method other than impeachment. It based this holding upon
the premises that the power to remove is the power to control and that
a legislative agent may not hold executive power. Such an analysis calls
into question Congress's ability to insulate from the President "inde-
pendent" officers who wield executive power by limiting his ability to
remove them.
Furthermore, the Court's determination to clearly distinguish powers
and officers as legislative, executive, or judicial portends trouble for the
present administrative structure of government. Officers who exercise a
combination of the three primary powers have no place in the Court's
view of the Constitution.
Bowsher is above all a return to the principles of Montesquieu:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." 9' Whereas
89. 106 S. Ct. at 3200 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 3199 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. See text accompanying supra note 7.
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previous courts had given lip service to these principles, the Bowsher
Court seemed determined to put them into practice.
Dan Balhoff
